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We present a scheme to realize a quantum key distribution using vacuum–one-photon entangled
states created both from Alice and Bob. The protocol consists in an exchange of spatial modes
between Alice and Bob and in a recombination which allows one of them to reconstruct the bit
encoded by the counterpart in the phase of the entangled state. The security of the scheme is
analyzed against some simple kind of attack. The model is shown to reach higher efficiency with
respect to prior schemes using phase encoding methods.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 42.50.Dv
Quantum cryptography, or, more correctly, quantum
key distribution (QKD), allows two parties (Alice and
Bob) to generate a secret key, which can be used as a
one-time pad, with the guarantee that nobody else can
significantly access the key. Whereas in the case of clas-
sical key distribution the security is connected with the
computational complexity needed to acquire information,
QKD secrecy is based on the laws of quantum mechan-
ics [1]. The first mechanisms exploited is the Heisenberg
uncertainty principle, suggested by Bennett and Bras-
sard in Ref. [2] (BB84), while the other main proposal,
introduced by Ekert [3], relies on the use of entangled
states. The BB84 protocol [2] is based on the use of
two nonorthogonal bases, and has to be distinguished by
other schemes, such as the so-called B92 (Ref. [4]) us-
ing only two nonorthogonal states, and different schemes
which involve six states [5, 6]. More recently, a lot of
attention has been devoted to the possibility of using
the same criteria of secrecy to realize protocols for de-
terministic secure direct quantum communication [7, 8].
The polarization encoding technique in BB84 is limited
by birefringence effects when optical fibers are used as
channels, and thus phase encoding seems to be preferable
for stability in long-distance communication [9, 10, 11].
More recently, a differential phase-shift mechanism has
been introduced [12] which shows higher efficiency with
respect to the previous models.
Here we propose a new scheme of phase encoding based
on vacuum–one-photon entangled states, which involves
a complete symmetry between Alice and Bob, and is de-
signed for stable transmission. A very different proposal
for quantum cryptography which uses also single-particle
entanglement appears in Ref. [13]. The scheme is de-
picted in Fig. 1. Alice wants to create a QKD and to
share it with Bob. She uses a single-photon source which
injects the photon either on the mode a1 or on the mode
a2. The modes a1 and a2 are mixed in a beam splitter
(BSa) and then the single photon is entangled on the two
output modes a′
1
and a′
2
. In terms of field operators the
BSa action on the input-output modes is represented by
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FIG. 1: Scheme for QKD using two single-photon entangled
states. The shaded area represents the public channel and
is the region where eavesdropping can take place. Alice (left
side) and Bob (right side) use the respective single-photon
sources to create two entangled states, encoding the bit on the
phase, on the output modes of BSa and BSb. Each of them
stores one mode in a secure area and sends the other mode to
the counterpart. The protocol is concluded via the recombina-
tion on the beam splitters BSab and BSba and the statement
of Alice (the scheme works also exchanging the roles) of which
detectors (Da1 or Da2) has counted one photon. Comparing
this information with his result (click on Db1 or Db2), Bob
acquires the secret information.
aˆ†
1
=
1√
2
(
aˆ′†
1
+ aˆ′†
2
)
(1)
and
aˆ†
2
=
1√
2
(
aˆ′†
1
− aˆ′†
2
)
. (2)
(aˆ†i creates a photon on the mode ai). Thus the out-
put state is 2−1/2 (|01〉+ |10〉) if the photon is put in the
mode a1 or 2
−1/2 (|01〉 − |10〉) if the photon is put in the
mode a2. These two possible choices represent the logic
values (the bit) which Alice wants to add in the QKD.
2Therefore the bit is encoded in the phase of the entangled
state emerging from BSa which we conveniently rewrite
as 2−1/2 (|01〉+ n |10〉) with n = −1, 1 (n = 1 will corre-
spond to the logic value 1, n = −1 will correspond to the
logic value 0).
Bob, being far apart, realizes the same opera-
tion through his own apparatus and creates the state
2−1/2 (|01〉+m |10〉) (again, m = −1, 1) on the modes b′
1
and b′
2
. Obviously, n and m are completely uncorrelated.
Afterwards, Alice (Bob) stores the mode a′
1
(b′
1
) and
sends to Bob (Alice) the mode a′
2
(b′
2
). Each of them has
a second beam splitter (BSab and BSba) which is used to
mix the mode previously stored with the mode received
from the counterpart.
The initial state is
|φ〉 = 1
2
(∣∣0a′
1
1a′
2
〉
+ n
∣∣1a′
1
0a′
2
〉) (∣∣0b′
1
1b′
2
〉
+m
∣∣1b′
1
0b′
2
〉)
.
(3)
Because of the unitary operation associated to BSab and
BSba, which consists of field mode relations analogous to
Eqs. (1) and (2), the state |φ〉 becomes
|φ〉 = 1
2
√
2
[m (|0ab10ab22ba10ba2〉 − |0ab10ab20ba12ba2〉) + n (|2ab10ab20ba10ba2〉 − |0ab12ab20ba10ba2〉)+
+ (mn− 1) (|0ab11ab21ba10ba2〉+ |1ab10ab20ba11ba2〉) + (mn+ 1) (|0ab11ab20ba11ba2〉+ |1ab10ab21ba10ba2〉)]. (4)
The protocol provides a measure realized both by Alice
and Bob on the output modes of BSab and BSba. The
scheme works if and only if one and only one photon is de-
tected by Alice and one and only one photon is detected
by Bob. Thus the terms corresponding to two photons
entering in one beam splitter and zero photons entering
in the other beam splitter do not contribute, fixing to
1/2 the efficiency of the model.
Here we note that, in order to observe quantum inter-
ference on BSab and BSba, and this is exactly the sit-
uation from which Eq. (4) is derived, the wave packets
impinging the input arms of the beam splitters are re-
quired to be completely indistinguishable [18]. To create
such a situation the stored modes have to be opportunely
delayed.
Let us suppose that Alice measures one photon on the
mode ab1. The state corresponding to this result is
|φ〉 =1
2
[(mn+ 1) |1ab10ab21ba10ba2〉+ (mn− 1)
× |1ab10ab20ba11ba2〉].
(5)
As a consequence, Bob will detect his photon on the mode
ba1 if m = n or on the mode ba2 if m = −n. If Alice had
counted “1” on the mode ab2 the role of Bob’s detectors
would change with respect to the relation between m and
n.
Then, Alice sends on the public channel her result to
Bob, who, comparing the two results, is able to iden-
tify the value of n to add to the key. Due to the com-
plete randomness of the output Alice’s result, there is no
connection between the information sent on the public
channel and n. We assume that Alice and Bob perform
the measurements in time coincidence. The public state-
ment of which detector has counted one photon can take
place after the entire key has been realized, as usual in
QKD schemes, in analogy with basis reconciliation in the
BB84.
Analyzing the scheme, one can state that the bit ex-
change is realized via entanglement swapping [14] from
the modes a′
1
, a′
2
and b′
1
, b′
2
to the modes ab1, ab2 and
ba1, ba2, as already suggested in the framework of quan-
tum cryptography [15, 16]. The scheme described is in
some aspect related to a cryptographic system recently
realized [17]: also in that system both Alice and Bob cre-
ate and exchange the key. The main differences concern
the encrypting method (the polarization of photons) and
a time hierarchy between Alice’s and Bob’s operations.
As we shall later, this aspect will appear significant in
the security of the scheme.
As in any QKD scheme, we need to consider the pos-
sibility that an eavesdropper (Eve) is trying to gain in-
formation, or simply to disturb the transmission in order
to create errors in the reception.
Then, a control procedure has to be introduced. The
simple idea is as follows: for a random subset of bits,
during the public discussion, Alice can claim both which
detector has recorded the photon and the value of n en-
coded, giving to Bob the possibility to verify that the
global state was not affected by external interactions.
Apart from limitations on QKD arising from experi-
mental imperfections regarding generation, transmission,
and detection of qubits [19], we shall focus our attention
on some simple attack strategy by some external eaves-
dropper.
First we describe the possibility of an attack only
aimed to create errors in the key. If the disturbance
consists in the subtraction of one photon the protocol
automatically fails and there are no effects on the QKD
creation. Better, Eve can act modifying the phase of the
photons traveling in the public channel by an amount
between 0 and pi. In such a circumstance the control
procedure is able to detect the interference: if the phase
change is pi the role of detector pairs with respect to m
and n is completely inverted, and when Alice announces
3both the result and n, Bob immediately discovers Eve’s
action. More significant is the case of phase change equal
to pi/2: now just about in 50% of cases the action induces
an error, and it is possible that when Alice launches the
control routine Bob does not note the introduction of a
third part. However, after ν control steps, the probability
that Eve is not revealed is (1/2)
ν
and can be arbitrarily
reduced. In the case of phase variation less than pi/2 the
number of control routines to get a given confidence level
increases, but the probability that Eve’s action influences
the key decreases.
Let us consider the case that Eve wants actually to get
the key. Since the secret is encoded in the phase of an
entangled state, and one of the components of the state is
not accessible to anyone but Alice, there is no way to get
information acting only on the public mode. Formally,
this feature is expressed stating that the reduced density
matrix of a single mode is diagonal and corresponds to a
one-qubit maximally mixed state. The simplest method
Eve can use is the intercept/resend strategy using the
same setup as Bob. Naturally, Eve does not know ei-
ther n nor m and has to create a different one-photon
entangled state 2−1/2 (|01〉+ p |10〉) (p = −1, 1), to mix
her state with Alice’s state and to wait for Alice’s an-
nouncement about the measurement result to conclude
the operation. As in the regular procedure between Al-
ice and Bob, the scheme fails in half the number of cases,
while in the remaining cases Eve acquires the bit. The
quantum bit error rate (QBER) introduced by Eve in
the sifted key (here represented by all bit exchanges with
one photon detected by Alice and one photon detected
by Bob) is 1/2, due to lack of correlation between n and
p, while the amount of information gained by Eve is 1/2
per bit. Thus, comparing our model with the BB84, we
conclude that, while Eve gets the same amount of in-
formation, she induces a QBER which is twice, and this
feature strongly improves the robustness of the system
against these attacks.
On the other hand, even when the eavesdropping ac-
tion is performed, Bob needs to receive a mode from Al-
ice. This aspect involves the resending strategy that Eve
can choose. Eve used one photon to copy Bob’s oper-
ation, and whichever is the number of photons sent to
Bob (0, 1, a combination of 0 and 1) the total number
of photons revealed by Alice and Bob is no longer 2,
but depends on the measurement process. Hence, by
checking the numbers of contemporary clicks, Alice and
Bob discover the presence of an eavesdropping action and
abort the transmission. Moreover, even if the total pho-
ton number is 2, by the control routine mentioned above,
Eve can be detected, due to the complete absence of cor-
relation between n,m, and p. One can argue that the
eavesdropper can first find n and then send to Bob the
correct state 2−1/2 (|01〉+ n |10〉), but Alice’s announce-
ment happens after Bob’s measurement, so that the use
of coincidence measurements guarantees against this kind
of action.
A more detailed analysis of eavesdropping influence on
the counting rate can be formulated as follows. At the
time of her own measurement, Eve learns how many pho-
tons Alice will count. Let us suppose that she is able (Eve
is a quantum devil) first to perform the measurement and
successively choose the resending strategy. The follow-
ing situations are possible: (i) Eve knows that Alice will
measure two photons: in such a case the best choice she
can make is to send nothing to Bob; (ii) Alice measures
zero photons: now the choice to minimize the error is to
send one photon to Bob; (iii) Alice measures one photon:
now the resending strategy does not matter. As a result,
eavesdropping modifies the number of detected photons
in half of the cases.
Therefore the control about the counting rate repre-
sents a powerful method to reveal eavesdropping to add
to the control routine. Actually, in order to exploit this
feature, a multiphoton resolution is needed, and this not
yet fully available in the present laboratory technology,
although some important step has been made [20, 21].
Naturally, Eve can use an alternative strategy. She
can create in any circumstance two entangled states to
share with Alice and Bob, and, moreover, she can pre-
pare other fake photons to send in order to enforce both
Alice and Bob to count one photon. The cost to pay
for this strategy is the following: due the probabilistic
nature of projections, Alice and Bob expect to measure
one photon just in 1/2 of cases; then Eve should simulate
such behavior leaking a big amount of information. Thus
this strategy is not convenient.
Another simple eavesdropping strategy is the so-called
beam-splitting attack. Let us suppose that a coher-
ent, weak source of photons is used instead of a single-
photon source. Then, with a probability small but finite,
the source can inject two (or more) photons. In BB84
schemes, the two photons contain the same information.
Then, Eve can subtract one of them and, after the public
discussion, perform the measurement selecting the right
basis. In such a way she acquires the bit without intro-
ducing any kind of noise. Let us analyze what happens
in our case, when, for example, Alice injects two photons
onto BSa. The initial state is
|φ〉 = 1
2
√
2
(∣∣0a′
1
2a′
2
〉
+
∣∣2a′
1
0a′
2
〉
+ n
∣∣1a′
1
1a′
2
〉)
(
∣∣0b′
1
1b′
2
〉
+m
∣∣1b′
1
0b′
2
〉
).
(6)
A simple observation to make is that
Eve should be able to factorize the state(∣∣0a′
1
1a′
2
〉
+ n
∣∣1a′
1
0a′
2
〉) (∣∣0a′
1
1a′
2
〉
+ n
∣∣1a′
1
0a′
2
〉)
from(∣∣0a′
1
2a′
2
〉
+
∣∣2a′
1
0a′
2
〉
+ n
∣∣1a′
1
1a′
2
〉)
, and to keep one
copy. The global nonlocality and the inaccessibility of
the mode a′
1
forbid this kind of eavesdropping strategy.
Obviously, also the protocol fails due to the number
of photons. What matters is that the security of the
scheme is robust with respect to that situation.
Let us come back to analyze the differences between
our proposal and the QKD realized by Degiovanni et al.
[17]. In that case there is a time ordering between the
4encoding operations of sender and receiver: that is, Al-
ice create a secrete state, Bob acts on that state, and
then resends it to Alice. Therefore an eavesdropper can
extract some information by monitoring the state before
and after Bob’s action. In our case we assume that Alice
and Bob perform all operations in coincidence. Therefore
all the information traveling on the public channel is not
useful.
On the other hand, the presence of two senders and
two receivers makes our scheme vulnerable versus a sub-
tle strategy: Eve can short-circuit both Alice and Bob
creating two Mach-Zehnder interferometers. In such a
case the two speakers are separated and each single mea-
surement result depends only, in a deterministic way, by
the initial state created by the respective speaker. Thus
Eve has only to wait for the public communication to
perfectly eavesdrop the bit without introducing noise.
Against this kind of attack, we are helped by the con-
trol method introduced by Degiovanni et al. Actually,
checking the correlation between, for instance, the mode
which Alice stores and the mode which she send to Bob,
it is possible to reveal Eve’s presence in half of cases.
The theoretical efficiency E of the scheme can be eval-
uated following the criteria introduced in Ref. [22]:
E =
bs
qt + bt
, (7)
where qt is the number of quantum bit exchanged, bt is
the number of classical bit exchanged, and bs is the num-
ber of secret bits added to the key. In our case, consid-
ering the “ single shot” efficiency, and the fact that both
Bob and Alice add one bit, one finds qt = 2, bt = 1, and
bs = 1, from which follows E = 1/3. If the same criterion
is applied to Ref. [12], avoiding the use of active switches,
that are not suitable for long distance fiber communica-
tion, we get E = 1/6. In the case of BB84 protocols
the maximum efficiency that can be reached is E = 1/4.
Thus our proposal seems to give some advantage. Ac-
tually, one should consider some unavoidable effect that
could lower the practical efficiency of the scheme. For
instance, our proposal requires the contemporary detec-
tion of two photons. Thus, the success probability scales
with the square of detection efficiency, in contrast with
the usual situation, where just one detection is needed.
To summarize, we have introduced a method to create
a random QKD based on a mechanism of bit exchange
between sender and receiver. The secret is encoded in the
phase of a single-photon entangled state. Although the
encoding is realized only through two orthogonal states,
as in the Goldenberg-Vaidman protocol [23], quantum
mechanics guarantees that no information is extracted
acting just on a subsystem, and only the product be-
tween Alice’s and Bob’s states allows us to extract the
key element. The security of the scheme against simple
eavesdropping techniques, such as intercepting/resending
strategy and beam-splitting attack, has been analyzed.
Finally, a comparison with other phase encoding based
schemes has been performed, showing the advantages of
our proposal if addressed to long-distance optical fiber
transmission. The scheme is completely symmetric with
respect to the role of Alice and Bob, and is suitable for in-
formation exchange in a sort of quantum dialogue. Prob-
ably, the main obstacle towards a possible realization of
the proposed protocol is represented by the difficulty to
achieve photon number resolution.
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